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Summary 
 
This work examines the impact that economic growth can have on biodiversity and on the 
ecological dynamics that would naturally emerge in the absence of human activity. The loss 
of biodiversity may induce policy-makers to implement defensive actions that prevent single 
species from extinction. These defensive actions, however, may deeply alter the natural 
dynamics of interaction between species, leading to an ecological equilibrium that is 
completely different from the one that would exist in the absence of human intervention. This 
suggests that there might exist a conflict between preserving biodiversity (through 
stabilization of the ecological system) and preserving the intrinsic features of the ecological 
dynamics. To investigate this issue more deeply, we analyze the impact that different 
objective functions and defensive technologies can have on the natural ecological dynamics, 
and show that human action can modify the stability of the ecological fixed points. From the 
simple analytical formulations adopted in the paper, it emerges that it is possible to stabilize 
the ecological fixed point and consequently to avoid the extinction of a species, even in the 
absence of defensive expenditures specifically finalized at the protection of that species. The 
stabilizing. effect of human intervention, however, turns out to be enhanced when specific 
defensive expenditures are implemented. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that human 
activity can have an even deeper impact on the ecological dynamics, substantially modifying 
not only the stability of the fixed points, but also their number. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, world-wide ecological problems, such as global warming and
ozone depletion, have played an increasingly central role in the scientiÞc de-
bate on the state of the environment. Among these problems, special attention
has been devoted to the loss of biodiversity of the ecosystem, mainly for two
reasons. In the Þrst place, because many researchers believe that this loss is
currently occurring at an unparalleled rate in human history.1 In the second
place, because biodiversity is considered essential for human survival, and in
many cases cannot be replaced by man-made physical capital. These two cate-
gories of reasons help to explain the attention recently devoted to this subject
in both political and academic spheres. As regards the political debate, at the
Johannesburg Summit of 2002 the conservation of biodiversity was recognized
as a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable development
and as one of the absolute priorities of future environmental policies. As to the
academic debate, many contributions have sought to make an economic evalu-
ation of biodiversity. Certain authors (Montgomery et al., 1999) have proposed
a theoretical framework from which the value to be attributed to biodiversity
could be derived in order to guide the decisions of the policy-makers. Other au-
thors, instead, have criticized the traditional approach of economic theory based
on the identiÞcation of the correct market price for natural resources, emphasiz-
ing the fact that the exchange value of biodiversity is only a tiny portion of its
total value (Gowdy, 1997) and that neither very high nor very low market prices
can ensure the survival of a particular species (McDaniel and Gowdy, 1998). In
more general terms, several contributions (von Amsberg, 1995) question the in-
tertemporal eﬃciency of the markets in guiding investment decisions under risk
and argue that the excessive reduction of biodiversity can be seen as a speciÞc
example of this general result.2
Alongside this strand of literature dealing with the markets capacity to eval-
uate biodiversity, a growing interest has also been devoted to the relationship
between biodiversity, ecological stability and the sustainability of economic de-
velopment. More speciÞcally, several authors (Perrings 1995, Atkinson et al.
1999) have focused attention on the link between sustainable development and
resilience (Holling, 1973), which is an indicator of the stability of the ecosys-
tem and can be closely approximated by the biodiversity existing within the
ecosystem.3 Using an optimal control model, Li and Lofgren (1998) have ex-
amined the eﬀect that the interaction between human activity and biodiversity
can have on the stability of the economic and ecological systems. Cabo et al.
(1999) have analyzed the relation between biodiversity and growth through a
1Although similar episodes of destruction of biodiversity have occurred in the past (as in
the case of the extinction of the dinosaurs) the present loss of biodiversity appears to be
related to human activity and not to exogenous natural phenomena (Heal, 1994).
2Gowdy and McDaniel (1995) go even further in their criticism of the market system,
claiming that the organizational principles governing the market are inherently in conßict
with the self-regulatory principles of the ecosystems.
3 See Common and Perrings (1992) for precise mathematical deÞnitions of stability and
resilience.
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model in which the North transfers capital to the South. Tisdell (1999) has
investigated the eﬀect of growth on biodiversity through the analysis of a case
study regarding China. Barbier and Schulz (1997) have examined the way in
which the inclusion of the biodiversity value modiÞes the results of both closed
and open economies in a traditional model of growth and resource exploitation.
The present study intends to contribute to this strand of research, analyzing
the impact that human activity can have on the defence of biodiversity and on
the natural ecological dynamics, namely, on the ecological dynamics that would
naturally emerge in the absence of human interference.
The natural law of evolution can obviously lead to the extinction of some
species. However, as Barney (1980) has pointed out, most of the recent biodiver-
sity loss is due to the impact of human activity. To counterbalance this trend,
policy makers can implement defensive actions that try to prevent single species
from extinction.4 Such defensive actions can be speciÞcally aimed at preserving
particular species or generically designed to protect the habitat where species
live. For instance, providing to an endangered species the food it needs to sur-
vive is an example of speciÞc defensive expenditure, whereas introducing costly
policy measures to reduce polluting activities in a biodiversity rich area can
be interpreted as a generic defensive expenditure. All defensive expenditures,
whether generic or speciÞc, may help preserving biodiversity, but they may also
deeply modify the natural dynamics of interaction between the species. Human
action can therefore lead to an ecological dynamics that ensures species persis-
tence, but turns out to be completely diﬀerent from that which would exist in
the absence of mankind. These considerations raise the kind of questions that
we intend to address in the present paper, namely: what is the impact of hu-
man intervention on the stability and the number of ecological equilibria? Can
defensive expenditures succeed in preserving biodiversity and to what extent?
Can generic defensive expenditures be suﬃcient for this purpose?
To answer these questions, in what follows we will consider a stylized ecosys-
tem in which the ecological dynamics is given by the interaction between two
species, species x and species y. More speciÞcally, for the sake of simplicity we
shall assume that the ecological dynamics is represented by the following linear
system:
x˙ = β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y
y˙ = β2 + ρ2y + γ2x
(1)
where β1,β2 > 0 while the other parameters may assume positive or neg-
ative value depending on the type of interaction occurring within each species
as well as between them (symbiotic, prey-predator etc.). We have deliberately
chosen to keep the stylized ecosystem as simple as possible to allow for more
4As some authors have argued (Shogren and Crocker, 1999; Shogren, 2000; Perrings, 2003),
decision makers can respond to exogenously induced changes in the natural ecological dynam-
ics in two ways: through mitigation and adaptation. In this paper we will consider defensive
expenditures of the Þrst kind, that try to reduce the likelihood of the event rather than simply
adapt to it.
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complex dynamics that could arise in the integrated model from the interaction
between the economic and the ecological components.5 System (1), however,
can be interpreted as the linearization around a Þxed point of a more complex,
non-linear system (such as Lotka-Volterra equations). Since in this study we will
concentrate on the local stability analysis of the systems, notice that the linear-
ity hypothesis does not constitute here any loss of generality. The dynamics (1)
can be thought of as the evolution that species would naturally follow if we let
Nature take its course and will be our benchmark throughout the paper. The
objective of our study is to analyze how economic growth and the underlying
agents decisions can modify the stability characteristics of a Þxed point of the
ecological dynamics (1) (provided this exists). For this purpose, we will exam-
ine a simple growth model that links the ecological dynamics (1) to a physical
capital accumulation dynamics. The interdependencies between the economic
growth and the ecological dynamics (1) will be given by the negative ecological
eﬀects of aggregate consumption, and by the positive ecological eﬀects of the
defensive environmental choices. The negative impact of aggregate consumption
on the evolution of the species can be interpreted as the reduction in animal and
vegetal populations generated by anthropogenic polluting activities. Thus, for
instance, production and consumption activities can contribute to global warm-
ing that is considered as the main culprit for the collapse of several species.6
The defensive and consumption choices depend on the objective function max-
imized by the representative agent as well as on the defensive technology at
disposal. To analyze the impact that diﬀerent objective functions and diﬀerent
defensive technologies have on the ecological dynamics, we shall take three dif-
ferent theoretical formalizations into account. In model 1 we shall assume an
objective function in which both species x and y are essential (i.e. the marginal
utility of each species tends to inÞnite as the number of individuals of the species
approaches zero) and a defensive technology which prevents discrimination be-
tween the two species. In model 2 we will analyze the same objective function,
but in this case it will be assumed that it is possible to implement speciÞc de-
fensive expenditures for species x and for species y. Finally, in model 3 we will
hypothesize that the objective function depends on an aggregate measure of x
and y, as implicitly assumed in models in which environmental resources are
represented by a single state variable. In this case, therefore, the representative
agent does not care for biodiversity and makes generic defensive expenditures.
In the following analysis we will show that when x and y are both suﬃciently
high at the Þxed point, the stability features of this point are completely pre-
served. On the contrary, when x and y are suﬃciently low at the Þxed point,
human intervention may cause a stabilization of the Þxed point that is necessary
5Chen (1997), for instance, has shown that chaotic dynamics can arise in a globally com-
bined climatic-economic system even though none of the two systems behaves cahotically on
its own. See also the interesting paper by Rosser (2001) for further discussion and analysis of
complex dynamics in economic-ecological systems.
6 In this sense, in line with several works in the literature (e.g. Brock, 1977; Forster, 1973;
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 1993) the model can be seen as an optimal growth model with
pollution rather than an optimal harvesting model.
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to prevent the extinction of one or both species. This suggests that the deci-
sion makers may be compelled to choose between stabilization (preservation
of biodiversity) and the preservation of the intrinsic features of the dynamics
generated by the interaction between species.
The structure of the paper is as folllows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 investigate each
of the three models in turn, focusing on the local stability analysis of the Þxed
points to describe how results are aﬀected by changes in the objective function,
in the defensive technology and in the parameter values. Section 5 summarizes
the main Þndings of the paper and draw some concluding remarks on the conßict
between stabilization and preservation of the natural ecological dynamics that
emerge in the paper.
2 Model 1
Let us assume that there is a representative agent in the economy whose utility
depends on consumption (c) and on the amount of the two species x and y.
Following Li and Löfgren (1998), it can be argued that the two species enter
the utility function both for their amenity value and for their optional uses in
the future. We assume a logarithmic utility function in each argument, so that
the representative agent suﬀers an inÞnite welfare loss from zero consumption
as well as from the extinction of each species:
U = lnx+ a ln y + b ln c (2)
where a, b > 0.
Suppose there is a single good in the economy that is produced by capital
alone (k). The corresponding output is used for capital accumulation, consump-
tion and defensive expenditures (d):
k˙ = kα − c− d (3)
where 0 < α < 1.
Human activity inßuences the natural ecological dynamics through aggregate
consumption and defensive expenditures. The impact of defensive expenditures
on the species evolution is assumed to be a decreasing function of the expendi-
tures, so that their eﬀectiveness decreases as they increase. We consider here the
case in which there are no speciÞc defensive expenditures, namely, the defensive
technology cannot distinguish between the two species:
x˙ = β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ (4)
y˙ = β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ (5)
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where σ1,σ2, ²1, ²2 > 0 and 0 < µ < 1.
The representative agent thus chooses consumption and defensive expen-
ditures so as to maximize the present discounted value of the utility function
subject to the physical capital accumulation dynamics and the modiÞed eco-
logical dynamics, that is, the natural ecological dynamics (1) as modiÞed by
human intervention. The optimization problem thus becomes:
max
c,d
Z ∞
0
(lnx+ a ln y + b ln c)e−rtdt
subject to equations (3)-(5) (6)
where r indicates the subjective discount rate (r > 0).
The current value Hamiltonian function is:
H = lnx+ a ln y + b ln c+ λ(kα − c− d)
+ θ(β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ)
+ η(β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ)
where λ, θ and η are respectively the multipliers of k, x and y, and have the
usual interpretation of shadow prices.
From the maximum principle, the Þrst-order necessary conditions for opti-
mality are:
∂H
∂c
=
b
c
− λ− ²1θ − ²2η = 0 (7)
∂H
∂d
= −λ+ µσ1dµ−1θ + µσ2dµ−1η = 0 (8)
x˙ =
∂H
∂θ
= β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ (9)
y˙ =
∂H
∂η
= β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ (10)
k˙ =
∂H
∂λ
= kα − c− d (11)
θ˙ = rθ− ∂H
∂x
= (r − ρ1)θ − γ2η −
1
x
(12)
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η˙ = rη − ∂H
∂y
= (r − ρ2)η − γ1θ−
a
y
(13)
λ˙ = rλ− ∂H
∂k
= λ(r − αkα−1) (14)
Substituting the optimal choices of the control variables c and d in the equa-
tions (9)-(14) and setting x˙ = y˙ = k˙ = θ˙ = η˙ = λ˙ = 0, we obtain the following
system of six diﬀerential equations whose solution provides the Þxed point of
the integrated economic-ecological system described in the model:
β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y −
²1b
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
+
σ1(σ1θ + σ2η)
2λ
= 0 (15)
β2 + ρ2y + γ2x−
²2b
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
+
σ2(σ1θ + σ2η)
2λ
= 0 (16)
kα − b
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
− (σ1θ + σ2η
2λ
)2 = 0 (17)
(r − ρ1)θ − γ2η −
1
x
= 0 (18)
(r − ρ2)η − γ1θ−
a
y
= 0 (19)
λ(r − αkα−1) = 0 (20)
In what follows we will refer to the solution of this system as the Þxed point
of the economic growth dynamics to distinguish it from the Þxed point of the
natural ecological dynamics that solves system (1).
2.1 Stability analysis of model 1
Let us now turn to the local stability analysis of the economic growth dynamics
and of the natural ecological dynamics (1) to compare the stability of the Þxed
point with and without human action. The analysis of the natural ecological
dynamics is straightforward. The Jacobian matrix of the natural system is:
J =
µ
ρ1 γ1
γ2 ρ2
¶
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therefore the characteristic polynomial proves to be:
z2 − (ρ1 + ρ2)z + ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 (21)
and the Þxed point is a saddle point if ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 < 0, is locally attractive
if ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 > 0 and ρ1 + ρ2 < 0 and is repulsive if ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 > 0 and
ρ1 + ρ2 > 0.
Before analyzing the local stability of the Þxed points of model 1, observe
that if the Jacobian matrix admits three negative (and hence three positive)
eigenvalues, then the Þxed point can be achieved, namely, for any initial state
(x0,y0,k0) suﬃciently close to the steady state it is possible to determine the
initial values of the co-state variables (θ0,η0,λ0) such that the economic growth
trajectory eventually converges to the Þxed point. If the number of negative
eigenvalues is strictly less than three, this is no longer possible a part for a
zero measure set of parameter values.7 Therefore, if the Þxed point of system
(1) is attractive, then the stability properties of the natural dynamics will be
preserved if the Þxed point of model 1 has three or more negative eigenvalues.
Similarly, if system (1) has a repulsive Þxed point, its stability properties will
be preserved with human intervention provided the Þxed point of model 1 has
less than three negative eigenvalues.
The Jacobian matrix for model 1 is given by:
Jc :=

ρ1 γ1 0 Hθ,θ Hθ,η Hθ,λ
γ2 ρ2 0 Hθ,η Hη,η Hη,λ
0 0 αk1−α Hθ,λ Hη,λ Hλ,λ
1
x2 0 0 r − ρ1 −γ2 0
0 ay2 0 −γ1 r − ρ2 0
0 0 α(1−α)λk2−α 0 0 r − αkα−1

where:8 Hθ,θ :=
²21b
φ2
+ σ
2
1
2λ ,Hθ,η :=
²1b²2
φ2
+ σ1σ22λ ,Hθ,λ :=
²1b
φ2
− σ1ψ
2λ2
,
Hη,η :=
²22b
φ2
+ σ
2
2
2λ ,Hη,λ :=
²2b
φ2
− 12 σ2ψλ2 ,Hλ,λ := bφ2 + 12 ψ
2
λ3
and φ := ²1θ+ ²2η+λ
, ψ := σ1θ + σ2η.
Observe that from (20) r−αkα−1 = 0 in the Þxed point. Also observe that
if the values of x and y are very high in correspondence of the Þxed point,
7Thus, for instance, if there is only one negative eigenvalue out of six, this implies that only
one trajectory will converge to the Þxed point in a six dimensional space, which can obviously
occurr only for very particular values of the state and co-state variables.
8Notice that Hi,j (i, j = θ, η,λ) indicates the second partial derivative of the Hamiltonian
(Þrst with respect to i and then with respect to j) in correspondence of the Þxed point.
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the 1x2 and
a
y2 terms in the Jc matrix assume values close to zero and are
therefore negligible. In other words, for suﬃciently elevated x and y values, the
eigenvalues of the Jc matrix have the same sign as those of the Jc0 matrix that
has been obtained from Jc by setting r−αkα−1, 1x2 and ay2 all equal to zero:9
Jc0 :=

ρ1 γ1 0 Hθ,θ Hθ,η Hθ,λ
γ2 ρ2 0 Hθ,η Hη,η Hη,λ
0 0 αk1−α Hθ,λ Hη,λ Hλ,λ
0 0 0 r − ρ1 −γ2 0
0 0 0 −γ1 r − ρ2 0
0 0 αλ2k1+α 0 0 0

Let us now analyze the characteristic polynomial of this simpliÞed matrix
Jc0. After several Gauss transformations, we obtain the following characteristic
equation:
EQ1(z)EQ2(z)EQ3(z) = 0
where
EQ1(z) := z
2 − (ρ1 + ρ2)z + ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2
EQ2(z) := z
2 + (ρ1 + ρ2 − 2r)z + ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 − r(ρ1 + ρ2) + r2
EQ3(z) := z
2 − rz − αλ
2k1+α
Hλ,λ
Notice that EQ1(z) coincides with the characteristic polynomial (21) of the
natural dynamics (1). Using this property, it is possible to prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 When x and y are suﬃciently high, the stability properties of
the Þxed point of the natural dynamics are entirely transferred to the Þxed point
of the economic growth dynamics.
Proof. See the Appendix
Therefore, if both species are suﬃciently abundant in correspondence of the
Þxed point, the economic activity and the defensive expenditures do not alter
the stability properties of the Þxed point of the natural dynamics. Thus, for
9This can be easily proved by solving the problem for the following set of parameter values:
α = µ = ρ1 = 0.5; ρ2 = −0.3; γ1 = −0.1; γ2 = 1.55;β1 = 1000;β2 = 4.5; r = 0.65;a = b =
²1 = ²2 = σ1 = σ2 = 10. In this case the values of the two species at the Þxed point are
x = 4020.48 and y = 30025.61 and it can be shown that the signs of the coeﬃcients of the
characteristic polynomial are maintained when passing from Jc to Jc00.
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instance, if system (1) has an attractive (repulsive) Þxed point, the economic
growth trajectories of model 1 will also converge (not converge) to their own
Þxed point.
So far we have examined the case where x and y are suﬃciently high at the
Þxed point. But what if we consider the more general case in which the two
variables can assume any possible (positive) value?
In this case the analysis of the Jacobian matrix Jc turns out to be exces-
sively complicated, so that it is necessary to resort to numerical examples. We
therefore proceed with a number of simulations, considering in the Þrst place
the case in which the Þxed point of the natural dynamics is repulsive.
2.2 Simulations of the model
The values used in the natural dynamics are as follows:. β1 = 4,β2 = 0.1, ρ1 =
0.18, ρ2 = −0.15,γ1 = −0.1, γ2 = 0.27114. The co-ordinates of the correspond-
ing Þxed point turn out to be:
x = 5244 and y = 9480
while the eigenvalues are:
λ1 = 0.025607 and λ2 = 0.004393.
For the economic growth dynamics we use the following additional parameters:
α = µ = 0.5; a = b = ²1 = ²2 = σ1 = σ2 = 10; r = 0.2.
At the Þxed point of the economic growth dynamics the state and control vari-
ables take the following values:
x = 208.066576, y = 301.201335, k = 6.25, c = 1.904725, d = 0.595275
with eigenvalues:
λ1 = λ2 = −0.021273, λ3 = λ4 = 0.221273, λ5 = −0.102566, λ6 = 0.302566.
From the simulation results, it emerges that the values of x and y in corre-
spondence of this Þxed point are much lower than at the Þxed point of the natu-
ral dynamics. Moreover, as suggested by the signs of the eigenvalues, while the
natural ecological dynamics show a repulsive Þxed point that cannot therefore be
reached by the correspondent trajectories (both eigenvalues being positive), the
economic growth trajectories can reach the Þxed point (3 negative eigenvalues).
Therefore, diﬀerently from Proposition 1, if x and y are not suﬃciently high at
the Þxed point the economic activity and the defensive expenditures produce a
stabilizing eﬀect that alters the stability properties of the Þxed point of the
natural dynamics. This seems consistent with our a priori expectations. Since
utility is logarithmic in x and y, agents would suﬀer an inÞnite welfare loss from
the extinction of one or both species (i.e. the loss of biodiversity). Therefore,
when x and y are suﬃciently low at the Þxed point, agents have an incentive
to increase their defensive expenditures in order to stabilize the Þxed point and
thus avoid the biodiversity loss that could derive from oscillations around an
equilibrium with low values of x and y or from trajectories that move away
from that equilibrium. It is interesting to notice that this stabilizing eﬀect ex-
ists even though the monitoring activity does not discriminate between the two
species. Thus, for example, if a share of income is directed to cleaning up the
sea, this may lead to an ecological equilibrium in which both the species x and
9
y under consideration (e.g., sharks and sardines) are preserved, although the
defensive expenditures for the protection of the sea do not discriminate between
the forms of life which populate it. However, the reduction in x and y at the
Þxed point seems to suggest that this stabilization eﬀect may come at the cost
of a reduction in the number of individuals for each population, thus generating
a trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of the species and their richness.
We then performed some comparative static analysis to examine how the
sign of the eigenvalues (and thus the stability of the Þxed point) changes with
the variation of x and y at the economic growth Þxed point. For this purpose,
it is suﬃcient to vary (coeteris paribus) the parameter β1. Figure 1 shows how
the state and control variables change as β1 changes in the interval [0.1, 10]
with a rate of 0.1, keeping the values of the other parameters as in the previous
analysis.
The vertical line indicates the threshold level of β1 (β1 = 7.1) that separates
the area on the left where the Þxed point can be reached by the economic growth
trajectories from the area on the right where it cannot be reached. The values
of x and y at the threshold level are x = 379.90 and y = 552.38.
As shown in the diagram, when the value of β1 decreases, the values of x
and y at the Þxed point also decrease. Therefore, in line with what one could
reasonably expect, the defensive expenditures increase with the reduction of β1
to reduce the risk of extinction of the species and the resulting disutility loss for
the agents. This alters the stability of the Þxed point, making it now reachable
from the growth trajectories (when β1 < 7.1), but reducing x and y at a much
lower level than in the case of an unstable Þxed point (when β1 > 7.1).
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Also observe that k is constant and takes on the value 1(2r)2 = 6.25. From
equation (20), in fact, it derives that k = ( rα)
1
α−1 , therefore the capital level is
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independent of β1 at the Þxed point. Moreover, from (11) k = (c+d)
1
α , so that
it must be (c+d) = ( rα)
α
α−1 at the Þxed point. Therefore, recalling that r = 0.2
and α = 0.5 in the simulations, for each value of β1 consumption and defensive
expenditures always sum up to the costant level 2.5 in the diagram, so that -as
Þgure 1 shows- an increase in defensive expenditures will come at the cost of a
reduction in consumption and viceversa.
We then performed comparative static analysis with respect to the intertem-
poral discount rate, by varying the parameter r in the interval [0.2, 0.75] with
a rate of 0.1. The outcome is represented below using a bar diagram for the
species x (Þgure 2) and for the species y (Þgure 3). The two Þgures show for
each value of r on the vertical axis, the correspondent values of x and y that
delimit the passage from a reachable to an unreachable Þxed point, each bar
indicating the maximum value of x (y) above which the Þxed point cannot be
reached.
As one can see, the threshold values of x and y increase with a reduction
in the intertemporal discount rate r. Therefore, if the economic agents are
relatively more patient, they exert a stronger stabilizing eﬀect, intervening
already at high values of x and y to ensure that the Þxed point can be reached
by the growth trajectories. The mechanism which determines this result is the
following: the more patient the agents, the greater is their level of accumula-
tion and therefore the higher is the level of (stabilizing) defensive expenditures
which they can aﬀord. Moreover, the more patient the agents (the greater the
importance they give to the future), the greater the disutility which they derive
from oscillations around the Þxed point that may eventually lead to biodiversity
loss in the future.
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Some interesting results can also be obtained by varying the environmental
impact of consumption (²) in the interval [1, 100] with a rate of 1. Figure 4
shows the correspondent trends of the state and control variables of the model,
assuming -for the sake of simplicity- an equal impact of aggregate consumption
on the evolution of the two species (²1 = ²2). The vertical line (at ² = 6.5)
separates the area where the Þxed point can be reached (on the right) from the
area where it cannot be reached (on the left).10
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10Notice that the two areas are now reversed with respect to Þgure 1. From the system (1),
in fact, increases in ² and β have opposite eﬀects on the evolution of the two species.
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As Þgure 4 shows, in this case an increase in ²i (i = 1, 2) provokes the pas-
sage from the area where the Þxed point cannot be reached to the area where
economic growth trajectories converge to it. An increase in the environmental
impact of consumption, in fact, reduces x and y at the Þxed point, provoking an
increase in defensive expenditures to stabilize the Þxed point. The same varia-
tion holds true for changes in σ1 and σ2, where an increase in the parameters
boosts the eﬃcacy of the defensive expenditures.11
Figure 5 shows a simulation of the trajectories converging to the Þxed point
in the integrated economic-ecological model 1 with the variation of the initial
values over time.
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Let us now analyze a numerical example concerning the case in which the
Þxed point of the natural dynamics is attractive. To make this example compa-
rable with the previous ones, we use a similar set of parameter values as before,
the only diﬀerence concerning the natural dynamics parameters ρ1 and ρ2 that
have now been set equal to 0.15 and −0.18, respectively.12 In this case, the
co-ordinates of the natural dynamics Þxed point are:
x = 90 and y = 480, with eigenvalues λ1 = −0.029289 and λ2 = −0.170711.
whereas the coordinates of the Þxed point in the growth dynamics are:
x = 171.2727, y = 210.5766, k = 6.25, c = 1.7368, d = 0.1774
with eigenvalues:
λ1 = λ2 = −0.5641,λ3 = −0.11097,λ4 = λ5 = 0.25641,λ6 = 0.31097.
From the simulations made varying the parameters, it emerges that the negative
sign of the three eigenvalues persists even with variations of ²1, ²2, σ1,σ2, β1,
11Results are available from the authors upon request.
12Notice that this change in the parameter values is necessary to satisfy the conditions for
an attractive Þxed point in the natural dynamics, i.e. ρ1 + ρ2 < 0 and ρ1ρ2 − γ1γ2 > 0
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β2. This suggests, therefore, that if a Þxed point is attractive for the natural dy-
namics, its stability properties are preserved by human intervention as the Þxed
point of the integrated model can always be reached by the growth trajectories,
independently of the parameter values.
The same applies when the Þxed point of the natural dynamics is a saddle
point, as it can be easily veriÞed through the use of numerical examples.13
2.3 Multiplicity of fixed points
A particularly interesting result is that a multiplicity of Þxed points can arise
in the economic growth model, even though the natural dynamics, being linear,
only allows at most one steady state. This can be easily proved by solving the
system (15)-(20) for the following set of parameter values:
β1 = 30, ρ1 = 0.003, γ1 = −0.18,β2 = 0.5,ρ2 = −0.005, γ2 = 1.55e−4,α = µ =
0.5, a = b = ²1 = ²2 = σ1 = σ2 = 10, r = 0.008.
In this case, we discover the contemporary presence of three Þxed points that
have, respectively, three, two and only one negative eigenvalue. As pointed out
above, only the Þxed point with three negative eigenvalues can be reached by
the growth trajectory. As we see, starting from a very simple natural dynam-
ics (linear and therefore with at most one Þxed point) the integrated model
generates a fairly complex dynamics of economic growth.
Figure 6 shows the simulation results obtained by varying β1 in the interval
[20, 200], with a rate of 1. The two curves in the diagram connect changes in
the sign of the eigenvalues to changes in x and β1. The upper branch of the
curve represents the set of pairs (x,β1) corresponding to the Þxed point with 2
negative eigenvalues, whereas the lower branch refers to the Þxed point with 3
negative eigenvalues. The two branches meet in correspondence of x = 22640.72
and β1 = 183.088. An analogous representation can be made for the species y.
The curve which represents the Þxed point with 1 negative eigenvalue is not
shown in Þgure 6 for scale reasons. To overcome this drawback, we also report
a diagram that shows how changes in β1 modify the number of simultaneously
existing equilibria. For this purpose, Þgure 7 represents the range of values
of β1 for which each of the three Þxed points exists. As the Þgure shows,
when β1 is above 183.088 (i.e. the meeting point of the two branches in Þgure
6), only the Þxed point with 1 negative eigenvalue exists. However, when β1
falls below that threshold level, also the other two Þxed points emerge from
the analysis, rising from one to three the possible steady state equilibria of
the model. When β1 falls even further (approximately around β1 = 60), the
Þxed point with three positive eigenvalues disappears.14 This changes again the
number of simultaneously existing equilibria from three to two, none of which
can be locally reached by the growth trajectories.
13 Simulation results are available from the authors upon request.
14This is represented by the discontinuity of the lower branch of the curve in Þgure 6 and
by the discontinuity of the lower line in Þgure 7.
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Finally, we also performed a simulation, varying the initial values of the two
species, at the converge point x = 22640.72 of the two branches with 3 and 4
positive eigenvalues. This simulation (shown in Þgure 8) enables us to glimpse
a dynamics of considerable interest, that seems to suggest the possible existence
of fairly complex dynamics around the Þxed point.15
15The analysis of the dynamics out of the equilibrium, however, goes beyond the scope of
the present paper and is therefore left for future research.
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3 Model 2
Let us now examine a variant of model 1 in which the defensive expenditures are
diversiÞed, that is some are speciÞcally allocated to sustaining species x, others
to species y. Assuming that the representative agent has the same objective
function as before, the optimization problem will now look as follows:
max
c,d1,d2
Z ∞
0
(lnx+ a ln y + b ln c)e−rtdt (22)
subject to:
k˙ = kα − c− d1 − d2 (23)
x˙ = β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ1 (24)
y˙ = β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ2 (25)
where defensive expenditures d1 are speciÞc to species x, while d2 are speciÞc
to species y.
The current value Hamiltonian function is:
H = lnx+ a ln y + b ln c+ θ(β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ1 ) +
+η(β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ2 ) + λ(kα − c− d1 − d2)
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From the maximum principle, we have:
∂H
∂c
=
b
c
− λ− ²1θ − ²2η = 0 (26)
∂H
∂d1
= −λ+ µσ1dµ−11 θ = 0 (27)
∂H
∂d2
= −λ+ µσ2dµ−12 η = 0 (28)
x˙ =
∂H
∂θ
= β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ1 (29)
y˙ =
∂H
∂η
= β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ2 (30)
k˙ =
∂H
∂λ
= kα − c− d1 − d2 (31)
θ˙ = rθ− ∂H
∂x
= (r − ρ1)θ − γ2η −
1
x
(32)
η˙ = rη − ∂H
∂y
= (r − ρ2)η − γ1θ−
a
y
(33)
λ˙ = rλ− ∂H
∂k
= λ(r − αkα−1) (34)
Substituting to the control variables c, d1 and d2 from (26)-(28) into (29)-
(34), the Þxed points of the model are the solutions of the following system of
six equations:
β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y −
²1b
λ+ ²1θ+ ²2η
+
σ21θ
2λ
= 0 (35)
β2 + ρ2y + γ2x−
²2b
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
+
σ22η
2λ
= 0 (36)
kα − b
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
− (σ1θ
2λ
)2 − (σ2η
2λ
)2 = 0 (37)
(r − ρ1)θ − γ2η −
1
x
= 0 (38)
(r − ρ2)η − γ1θ−
a
y
= 0 (39)
λ(r − αkα−1) = 0 (40)
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3.1 Stability analysis of model 2
The local stability analysis of the natural dynamics is obviously the same as in
model 1, therefore we focus here on the local behavior of the economic growth
dynamics of model 2.
The Jacobian matrix of model 2 is:
Jc =

ρ1 γ1 0
²21b
φ2
+
σ21
2λ
²1b²2
φ2
²1b
φ2
− σ21θ
2λ2
γ2 ρ2 0
²1b²2
φ2
²22b
φ2
+
σ22
2λ
²2b
φ2
− σ2η
2λ2
0 0 αkα−1 ²1b
φ2
− σ21θ
2λ2
²2b
φ2
− 12 σ
2
2η
λ2
b
φ2
+ σ
2
1θ
2
2λ3
+ σ
2
2η
2
2λ3
1
x2 0 0 r − ρ1 −γ2 0
0 ay2 0 −γ1 r − ρ2 0
0 0 α(1−α)λk2−α 0 0 r − αkα−1

where, as before, φ := ²1θ + ²2η + λ.
Given the similarity between this matrix and the corresponding Jacobian
in model 1, the observations made on that model using the simpliÞed matrix
Jc” hold true even in this case. Model 2 behaves in a substantially similar
manner to the previous model. The only signiÞcant diﬀerence is that with
discriminating defensive expenditures the stabilization eﬀect is ampliÞed, that
is, we obtain Þxed points with three negative eigenvalues (i.e. that can be
reached by the growth trajectories) for higher values of x and y. In the case of
speciÞc defensive expenditures, therefore, agents intervene to stabilize the Þxed
point at an earlier stage than before, without awaiting a further decline in the
stock of the two species as in the case of generic defensive expenditures. This can
be seen from Þgure 9 that compares the simulation results in the two models
for r which varies in the interval [0.2, 0.75] with a rate of 0.1. As the Þgure
shows, for any given value of r the threshold level of x and y is higher in model
2 than in model 1.16 Observe that this diﬀerence diminishes with the increase
in the value of r. In fact, the more impatient the agents (the higher r), the
lower the capital accumulation level and thus also the correspondent defensive
expenditures. A lower level of defensive expenditures reduces, therefore, their
capacity to stabilize the Þxed point, no matter whether they are generic or
speciÞc, hence decreasing also the diﬀerence in the eﬀects between the two kinds
of intervention.
16Recall that the threshold level of x and y represents the value of the two variables at the
Þxed point above which we pass from 3 to 1 negative eigenvalues, that is, from a reachable to
an unreachable Þxed point.
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In the following section we shall examine the variant in which the utility
depends on an aggregate measure of the two species; more speciÞcally, we
shall assume that x and y are perfect substitutes with a marginal substitution
rate equivalent to a. As we shall see, in this case we do not have a stabilization
eﬀect for low values of x and y. Instead what happens is that with low values
of x and y there are no longer Þxed points for the growth dynamics.
4 Model 3
In this case we assume that the objective function of the representative agent
comprises the global stock of environmental resources (here represented by the
weighted sum of the two species) and not the number of individuals of each
species. The optimization problem thus becomes:
max
c,d
Z ∞
0
[ln(x+ ay) + ln c] e−rtdt (41)
under the constraints (3)-(5) of model 1. The correspondent current value
Hamiltonian function is:
H = ln(x+ ay) + ln c+ θ(β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y − ²1c+ σ1dµ) +
+η(β2 + ρ2y + γ2x− ²2c+ σ2dµ) + λ(kα − c− d)
From the maximum principle it follows that the dynamics of x, y and k is
deÞned by the equations (9)-(11) while the dynamics of the co-state variables is
given by the following equations:
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θ˙ = rθ− ∂H
∂x
= (r − ρ1)θ− γ2η −
1
(x+ ay)
η˙ = rη − ∂H
∂y
= (r + ρ2)η + γ1θ −
a
(x+ ay)
λ˙ = rλ− ∂H
∂k
= rλ− αλkα−1 = λ(r − αkα−1)
where c and d must be chosen in such a way as to satisfy:
∂H
∂c
=
1
c
− λ− ²1θ − ²2η = 0
∂H
∂d
= −λ+ µσ1dµ−1θ ++µσ2dµ−1η = 0
The Þxed points are given by the solutions of the following system:
β1 + ρ1x+ γ1y −
²1
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
+
σ1(σ1θ + σ2η)
2λ
= 0
β2 + ρ2y + γ2x−
²2
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
+
σ2(σ1θ + σ2η)
2λ
= 0
kα − 1
λ+ ²1θ + ²2η
− (σ1θ + σ2η
2λ
)2 = 0
(r − ρ1)θ− γ2η −
1
(x+ ay)
= 0
(r − ρ2)η − γ1θ −
a
(x+ ay)
= 0
λ(r − αkα−1) = 0
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4.1 Stability analysis of model 3
Since the natural dynamics is obviously unchanged, like in model 2 it is here
suﬃcient to analyze the local behavior of the economic growth dynamics to
compare the stability properties of the systems with and without human action.
The Jacobian matrix of model 3 is:
Jc =

ρ1 γ1 0
²21b
φ2
+ σ
2
1
2λ
²1b²2
φ2
+ σ1σ22λ
²1b
φ2
− σ1ψ
2λ2
γ2 ρ2 0
²1b²2
φ2
+ σ1σ22λ
²22b
φ2
+ σ
2
2
2λ
²2b
φ2
− σ2ψ
2λ2
0 0 αkα−1 ²1b
φ2
− σ1ψ
2λ2
²2b
φ2
− 12 σ2ψλ2 bφ2 + 12 ψ
2
λ3
1
(x+ay)2
a
(x+ay)2 0 r − ρ1 −γ2 0
a
(x+ay)2
a2
(x+ay)2 0 −γ1 r − ρ2 0
0 0 α(1−α)λk2−α 0 0 r − αkα−1

where φ and ψ have the same values as before. This matrix is almost identical
to the Jacobian in model 1, the only diﬀerence concerns the Þrst two terms in
the fourth and Þfth rows.17 In model 1 all these terms became negligible if x and
y were both suﬃciently high. In this case, instead, it is suﬃcient that x or y gets
suﬃciently high for this property to apply. Therefore, the observations made in
model 1 using the simpliÞed matrix Jc0 in this case hold true even if only one of
the two species is very high. This means that -diﬀerently from models 1 and 2-
we do not have here a stabilization eﬀect even if, for example, x is very high
but y is very low (and therefore at risk of extinction). Since the representative
agent cares for the aggregate level of the two species, the potential extinction
of one of them does not necessarily provide disutility to the agent as long as its
reduction (and eventual disappearance) is compensated by the increase in the
other species.
Figure 10 shows the simulation results obtained by varying β1 as in the
previous models. When β1 > 9.8 it turns out that there exists a Þxed point but
it cannot be reached by the growth trajectories, whereas when β1 < 9.8 there
are no Þxed points, as suggested by the discontinuity of the curves in the Þgure.
Therefore, with the objective function of model 3, the Þxed points with low x
and y not only fail to be stabilized but actually cease to exist.
Observe that, like in model 1, k = (c+ d)
1
α and (c+d) = ( rα)
α
α−1 at the Þxed
point. Even in this case, therefore, capital as well as the sum of consumption
and defensive expenditures are constant as β1 changes.
17Recall that in model 1 these terms were 1/x2 and 0 in the fourth row, 0 and 1/y2 in the
Þfth row of the Jacobian.
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5 Concluding remarks
The objective of the present study was to analyze how human activity can alter
the natural ecological dynamics. To this end, focusing attention on local sta-
bility analysis, we examined the impact which economic growth and defensive
expenditures can have on the stability of the Þxed point of the ecological dy-
namics. Although this study is merely a preliminary and not exhaustive analysis
of the complex relations existing between economic activity and ecological evo-
lution, some interesting results emerge from the simple analytical formulation
adopted here that can contribute to stimulate the current debate on the role of
man in the defence of biodiversity. In the Þrst place, the solution of model 1
suggests that it is possible to stabilize the Þxed point of the ecological dynamics
and consequently to avoid the extinction of a species, even in the absence of
defensive expenditures speciÞcally Þnalized at the protection of that species.18
This stabilization of the Þxed point takes place only when x and y are suﬃ-
ciently low. As a matter of fact, in this case the agents have an incentive to
make defensive expenditures in order to avoid the loss of biodiversity (i.e. the
extinction of one or both species) that could derive from oscillations around an
equilibrium with low values of x and y. Nevertheless, comparing model 1 (in
which defensive expenditures do not distinguish between the two species) with
model 2 (in which they are speciÞc for each species), we observe that in the lat-
ter case the stabilization of the Þxed point occurs for higher values of x and y.
18This is what has actually happened, for instance, in the Marquesas where twenty years
ago the local authority decided to prohibit access to an island to protect its ecosystem. This
generic defensive action (that had a clear opportunity cost in terms of foregone tourism) has
led to the stabilization of the population of sooty terns that build their nests in that island
(National Geographic, 2003, p.123).
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Thus, for instance, if the agents can implement activities speciÞcally designed to
protect the dolphins (e.g. providing them with the necessary food, prohibiting
Þshing with cast nets19 , etc...) their protection from the risk of extinction
occurs at an earlier stage, without awaiting a further reduction in their number
as occurs in the case of defensive expenditures that protect the sea in a generic
sense. The introduction of speciÞc defensive expenditures tends, therefore, to
anticipate the stabilizing eﬀect of human intervention.
The above result appears to be coherent with the opposite eﬀect which
emerges in model 3 in which the representative agent cares for the set of ex-
isting species as a whole, but does not consider any of them essential in her
utility function. In this case the Þxed points are not stabilized even when there
is an endangered species, because the extinction of that species does not nec-
essarily provide disutility to the agent as long as its reduction (and eventual
disappearance) is compensated by the increase in the other species.
From the analysis of the models, moreover, it emerges that human activity
can have an even deeper impact on the ecological dynamics, substantially mod-
ifying not only the stability of the Þxed points, but also their number. This is
what happens, for example, in model 1, where the introduction of human activ-
ity into the analytical formalization increases from one to three the number of
the equilibria of the ecological dynamics.
The results obtained in this work seem to suggest that, although the present
model is very simple, it may provide some testable hypothesis on the eﬀects
that diﬀerent policies may have on the stability of an ecosystem and on the
number of its equilibria. The preliminary analysis developed in this paper can be
extended in various directions in the future. In the Þrst place, while the analysis
conducted so far is of a purely local nature, it would be interesting to carry out
also a global analysis to verify the possible existence of limit cycles or even more
complex dynamics beyond the equilibrium point, as some simulations performed
in the paper would seem to suggest (see Þgures 5 and 8). In the second place,
the conßict between stabilization and preservation of the natural dynamics that
emerge in the paper suggests some extensions of the analysis that would be
interesting to examine in the future. As we have seen in our formalizations,
human intervention can lead to the stabilization of the Þxed points, even when
these were not stable for the natural dynamics. The tendency to modify the
natural dynamics can be even more accentuated in reality by human preferences
and species behaviors. As to human preferences, people may be more willing to
pay to protect from extinction a species that is perceived as a defenceless prey
(e.g. the panda) rather than some aggressive and dangerous predator (e.g. the
shark). As a consequence, the social planner may Þnance more the interventions
that defend one species than another. Similarly, in the management of a natural
park, the managing body may have a speciÞc ecological model in mind (that
diﬀers from that of the natural ecological dynamics) in which one species may
be preferred to another because it attracts more tourists to the park. In this
19 It is estimated that this method of Þshing (that is very popular in the eastern tropical
PaciÞc) has caused the death of over seven million dolphins and the extinction of two species
of dolphins in the last thirty years (Wallach and Sforza, 2000).
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case, the social planner may be induced to stabilize the Þxed point at a higher
number of individuals of one species than another. In both examples, therefore,
human preferences may help to preserve single species from extinction, but they
also deeply modify the natural interaction dynamics among diﬀerent species.
Moreover, defensive expenditures may alter the natural ecological dynamics
even because they change species behavior. Suppose, for instance, that x and
y represent respectively the number of sardines and of tuna Þsh, and that the
defensive intervention takes the form of supplying man-made food to the two
species. In this case, the sardines and tuna Þsh would increase in number,
but the tuna Þsh would partially lose their typical predatory instinct towards
the sardines, thus altering what would have been the natural evolution of the
two species. Feeding species to avoid their extinction can therefore preserve
biodiversity, but this may come at the cost of an irreversible loss in the dynamics
of the ecosystem.
In conclusion, biodiversity plays an essential role in both human survival
(favoring the ecological equilibrium) and in anthropic activities (providing, for
example, active principles which can be exploited for the production of medici-
nal products in the pharmaceutical industry). The loss of biodiversity therefore
constitutes a signiÞcant risk for mankind, resulting in the potentially irreversible
loss of the genetic information comprised within it. For this reason the protec-
tion of biodiversity is extremely important to avoid entering the shadow area
in which risks are uncertain and potentially irreversible. However, as we have
tried to demonstrate in this study, the attempt to protect biodiversity may alter
the natural ecological dynamics, generating a conßict between the capacity to
preserve biodiversity for the beneÞt of future generations and the possibility of
leaving them the natural dynamics of the ecosystems. The need to harmonize
these diﬀerent requirements raises the problem of the criterion governing the
choice of the objective function on the part of the policy maker. Far from pre-
tending to provide exhaustive answers to such a complex argument, this paper
has simply tried to highlight this dilemma of choice so as to bring to the fore
an aspect which has up to now been frequently ignored in the debate on the
protection of biodiversity.
6 Appendix
We can distinguish three cases depending on whether the dynamics (1) has a
repulsive Þxed point, an attractive Þxed point and a saddle point.
6.1 Repulsive fixed point for the natural dynamics
The equation EQ1 = 0 produces two eigenvalues with positive real part. The
equation EQ2 = 0 generates 2 real positive eigenvalues, having the known term
always positive and the coeﬃcient of z always negative. Recall that from (18) r
is always greater than ρ1. Finally, the equation EQ3 = 0 features a negative and
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a positive solution. To sum up, the representation of the sign of the eigenvalues
is the following
EQ1 + +
EQ2 + +
EQ3 + −
From the above representation, we observe that there is only one negative
eigenvalue; this means that the Þxed point cannot (generically) be reached by
the economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the property of instability of
the Þxed point of the natural dynamics is transferred unaltered to the economic
growth dynamics.
6.2 Attractive fixed point for the natural dynamics
The equation EQ1 = 0 generates two eigenvalues with negative real part so that
the Þxed point of the natural dynamics is a sink. The equation EQ2 = 0 has
two positive real eigenvalues, and the equation EQ3 = 0 two eigenvalues of the
opposite sign. In synthesis, the following picture emerges:
EQ1 − −
EQ2 + +
EQ3 + −
Consequently we have three negative eigenvalues and the Þxed point can be
reached from the growth trajectory; this means that the maximum values of
the variables x and y, as well as that of the variable k, are constant. We would
recall that, as far as the variables x and y are concerned, this also occurred in
the natural dynamics.
6.3 Saddle-point for the natural dynamics
It is easy to observe that in this case the conÞguration of the signs of the
eigenvalues is given by
EQ1 + −
EQ2 + +
EQ3 + −
Consequently, in this case too the Þxed point is not generically reached by
the growth trajectory.
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